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An Administrative Learning Curve
Casualty Rehabilitation in the Canadian
Expeditionary Force
RICHARD

HOLT

Abstract: This article discusses the development of an efficient
administrative system in England to handle Canadian casualties
evacuated from units in France and Belgium. The system consisted not
only of medical treatment but also the management of casualties with a
view to returning as many as possible to the front lines. Specific topics
discussed include standing medical boards, command depots responsible
for physical training, and the disposal of those not fit for further
service in France. The article concludes that the creation of territorial
regimental depots in 1917 to manage casualties marked the transition of
the Canadian Expeditionary Force from a hastily organised body to a
well organised professional army.

n recent y e a r s ,

there has been some debate over whether British
and Canadian forces learned from their experiences and if there
was an identifiable “learning curve.” To date, the discussion has been
confined exclusively to operations on the battlefield. However, there
were also changes in the administrative sphere that were equally as
important and paralleled the transition of the Canadian Expeditionary
Force (cef ) from the militia of 1914 to the hard-hitting, professional
army of 1917-1918.
One of these administrative changes was the development of a
comprehensive system to return casualties1 evacuated from France and

I

1 The term includes both sick and wounded.
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Belgium to the reinforcement stream after recovery. Creating such a
system was important; in wartime, manpower is a vital commodity and
has to be carefully husbanded. Units in France depended on a steady
stream of reinforcements to maintain an effective fighting strength. Not
all of these reinforcements were fit men from Canada; a substantial
number were casualties who had been restored to full health.
Surprisingly, historians have paid little attention to the creation of
a comprehensive system for returning casualties to the reinforcement
stream. Colonel Nicholson’s magisterial official history does not
mention the topic, even in passing. However, as he wrote, the scope of
the book was such that much could be covered “only in broad outline,
for the limitations imposed by the covers of a single book have ruled
out the inclusion of much detail.”2 The official medical history, on the
other hand, contains a brief discussion of command depots but not
the overall system.3 Medical historians have overlooked the means by
which casualties were managed, perhaps because their interest lies in
medical and not administrative care.4
Returning casualties to the front was not a straightforward matter
since many of those discharged from hospital were not immediately
fit for active service and required a period of convalescence to rebuild
their strength. If these men were retained in hospital, they became
‘bed-blockers’. But if they were returned to a reserve unit5, they
became an unwelcome burden on staff who were fully occupied
training recruits. The problem, then, was what to do with these men
until they were fit for active service.
Initially, men discharged from hospitals who required ‘hardening’
before being recycled into the reinforcement stream were simply posted

2 Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1918 (Ottawa:
Queen’s Printer, 1964), xii.
3 Sir Andrew Macphail, The Medical Services, (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1925), 204-208.
4 Recent examples include Mark Harrison, The Medical War: British Military
Medicine in the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Bill
Rawling, Death Their Enemy Canadian Medical Practitioners and War (Quebec:
AGM V Marquis, 2001); and Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, Seventy Years of Service: A
History of the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps (Ottawa: Borealis Press, 1977).
Mark Humphries’s recent article “Willfully and With Intent: Self-Inflicted Wounds
and the Negotiation of Power in the Trenches,” Histoire sociale/Social History
XLVII, no. 94 (June, 2014) deals with administrative aspects but is limited to cases
of self-inflicted wounds in France.
5 Reserve units, based in England were intended to train fit soldiers who could then
be posted to France as reinforcements.
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Table 1: Reserve Battalions Unfit Men
April-December 19156
T em porarily

Perm anently

Month

Fit

U nfit

U nfit

C onvalescents

Total U nfit

P roportion
U nfit (Percent)

April

3929

673

78

340

1091

21.7

May

2842

643

123

3056

3822

57.4

June

4565

831

252

3097

4180

47.8

July

8093

843

278

3607

4728

36.9

August

8010

1008

376

3763

5147

39.1

September

8858

1226

496

3718

5440

38

October

10029

1730

541

3946

6217

38.3

November

15159

2062

552

3610

6224

29.1

December

15823

2953

953

3562

7468

32.1

Notes: (1) The Infantry Base Depot and the Automobile Machine Gun Brigade have been excluded
from the April return. (2) Battalions earmarked for the 3rd Division have been excluded from the
October and November returns.

to reserve units that had to be reorganised to accommodate these
convalescents. In July 1915, for example, the 9th Reserve Battalion
with the Canadian Training Division (ctd ) held physically fit trainees
in A, B, C and D companies while E and F contained those who were
unfit.6
7 Not all of the unfit had been previously wounded; there were
those who were permanently unfit for military service for whatever
reason but had to be kept in England because there were was no
formal administrative mechanism for disposing of them.8
Not surprisingly, as shown in Table 1, the number of unfit men
held by the reserve battalions increased steadily over time. These
unfit men must have been a significant administrative burden to
reserve battalion staffs whose primary duty was training infantrymen
and not caring for invalids. Private Cox of the 2nd Battalion, for
example, was shot in the left elbow at Ypres in April 1915, evacuated

6 TNA WO 114/26, Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents
at Home other than the Territorial Force 26 April 1915; TNA WO 114/57, Weekly
Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents at Home other than the
Territorial Force 31 May 1915, 28 June 1915, 26 July 1915 and 30 August 1915;
TNA WO 114/27, Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents
at Home other than the Territorial Force 27 September 1915, 25 October 1915, 29
November 1915 and 27 December 1915.
7 LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 4950 File 476 reel T-10761, Medical Officer’s War Diary
28 July 1915.
8 TNA WO 293/2, War Office Instruction 148 of 18 May 1915 directing that
members of the CEF who were permanently unfit for military service regardless of
the cause would be posted to the Canadian Training Division.
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to England 2 May 1915, and hospitalised in Sheffield. Discharged
from hospital in June 1915, Cox was then posted to the 12th
Reserve Battalion where he remained until he was pronounced fit
in February 1916 and drafted to France. Presumably the reserve
battalion provided remedial exercises during this time.9 In another
case, Private Blake of the 4th Battalion was evacuated (as a prisoner)
to England on 28 August 1915 suffering from a mental disease. On
arrival he was admitted to the 4th London General Hospital and
posted to the 12th Reserve Battalion. On 30 November 1915 he was
discharged to Canada ‘under escort’. There is no evidence he was
discharged from hospital and it is probable that he never reported to
the 12th Battalion. Nonetheless the unit was still responsible for his
administration.10 Lastly, Corporal Ferguson of the 15th Battalion was
repatriated to England in August 1915 after his leg was amputated in
a German prisoner of war camp. Posted to the 17th Reserve Battalion
on 11 September, he was discharged from Shorncliffe Military Hospital
23 September. Unlike Blake, Ferguson reported to the 17th and
remained with the unit until he was returned to Canada 22 October
1915. In this case the reserve battalion was responsible not only for
administration but for rations, quarters, and medical care.11
From a unit perspective, the problem with unfit men was acute
since they were not evenly distributed amongst the reserve battalions.
In May 1915, the 32nd Reserve Battalion held 336 convalescents
and seventy-eight trainees while the 23rd Reserve Battalion had
trainees only. A few months later, in September 1915, the 9th Reserve
Battalion had 866 invalids and 998 trainees, the 39th Reserve
Battalion had 832 unfit and 1,134 fit while the 48th had fit trainees
only. On average the eleven reserve units had 495 unfit men each.
A few months later, in December 1915, the majority of the unfit
were concentrated in nine battalions, leaving eight with only a few

9 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 2085, personnel file 8086 Lewis Cox.
10 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 801, personnel file 26512 George Blake. On
arrival in Canada Blake was diagnosed with ‘delusional insanity’ and committed to
the provincial asylum at St. Jean de Dieu at Longue Pointe, Quebec. He died at the
Westminster Veterans Hospital in London on 30 October 1967 after more than fifty
years in psychiatric institutions.
11 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 3040, personnel file 28022 Angus Ferguson.
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men who were temporarily unfit.12 The degree to which instructors
were diverted from their primary duties depended on the number of
invalids and in some reserve battalions the emphasis must have been
on handling the unfit. Clearly some form of holding unit was required
to allow the reserve battalions to get on with their primary job.
A s noted previously there was no formal administrative
mechanism to dispose of permanently unfit men or to accommodate
the wounded who required graduated exercises before re-entering
the reinforcement stream. The results were inevitable and as shown
in Table 1, almost a third of the invalids in reserve battalions in
December 1915 were unfit for military service. From a functional
point of view, these men presented two problems. First, more than a
third of the bed spaces at the principal cef training base at Shorncliffe
were taken up by invalids, leaving less than 14,000 spaces for fit
infantry trainees.13 Second, the hard-pressed training staff with the
reserve battalions had to devote time and energy to administering
the invalids, time that should have been spent on their primary job
of training reinforcements.
The British army had the same problem and in April 1915
created large convalescent hospitals as a solution. However, this
approach proved to be unsatisfactory since there was a general
shortage of hospital beds and many of the invalids did not require
hospitalisation but a regimen of graduated exercises to become fit for
the front. In October 1915, therefore, depots were formed in each of
the commands in Great Britain. Known as command depots these
were not hospitals but convalescent centres where recovering invalids
received “graduated exercises, including massage and therapeutic
gymnastics, the ultimate object being to harden invalids sufficiently
to enable them to join their reserve battalions within six months in a
condition fit for drafting overseas.”14 However, command depots were

12 TNA WO 114/57, Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents
at Home other than the Territorial Force 31 May 1915; TNA WO 114/27, Weekly
Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents at Home other than the
Territorial Force 27 September 1915, 25 October 1915 and 27 December 1915.
13 LAC RG 24 Vol 1841 File GAQ 10-39D, Minutes of a Conference held at the
War Office 28 April 1916 with representatives of the CTD, Director of Quartering,
Director of Organization and Director of Staff Duties noting that there were enough
huts for 21,000 men at Shorncliffe.
14 Major-General Sir W.G. MacPherson, History of the Great War: Medical Services
based on official documents General History: Vol I (London: H.M.S.O., 1921), 91.
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intended only for British troops; dominion forces had to make their
own arrangements.15
In December 1915, Canadian Director of Recruiting and
Organization Colonel F.A. Reid examined the problem of unfit men
with reserve units. His solution, modeled on the British command
depot, was to establish a Canadian casualty depot to care for men
discharged from hospital who required hardening. As Reid noted, this
casualty depot would allow the reserve battalions to focus on training
which “would bring them up to a far higher state of efficiency.”16 His
proposal was reviewed by ctd Headquarters at Shorncliffe and the
Director of Medical Services at Canadian Headquarters in London,
both of whom thought additional features should be added. As a
result, the proposal, which was approved by Canadian Headquarters
in January 1916, went far beyond Reid’s idea to establish a command
depot and instead created a comprehensive system to handle all those
who were medically unfit.
Under the new system, casualties evacuated from France and
Flanders to hospitals in England were posted to a new unit, the
Canadian Casualty Assembly Centre (ccac ). These postings were
based on casualty lists produced by General Headquarters 3rd
Echelon, the agency responsible for all personnel movements in
France, which meant the ccac nominal roll was only as accurate as
the information provided by the 3rd Echelon. Members of the cef
who had been discharged from hospitals in Britain were sent to ccac
Headquarters at Folkestone where they were assessed by a Standing
Medical Board. Those who were fully recovered were posted to a
reserve battalion and fed back into the reinforcement stream while
those who were unlikely to become fit within six months were posted
to another newly-created unit, the Canadian Discharge Depot, for
repatriation to Canada or release in the British Isles.17 Men who had
recovered but were fit for sedentary duties only were retained by
the ccac in garrison duty battalions to provide workers for routine
fatigues and relieve fit men for the front; those who showed an
aptitude for clerical work were trained by the School of Stenography

15 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 48 File 8-5-58, War Office circular letter 2 November 1915.
16 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, Director of Recruiting and Organization
to Officer i/c Records, Westminster 9 December 1915.
17 Lieutenant Ralph E. Mathews, Souvenir of the Canadian Discharge Depot;
Published as a Memento of the Last Rest Camp in England (privately printed, nd),
Copy held by the Imperial War Museum
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[Library and

Archives Canada PA 005133]

in London as replacements for fit clerks who could then be posted to
France.18 Finally, those who had not fully recovered but would likely
be fit within six months were posted to another unit, the Canadian
Command Depot (ccd ) at Monks Horton, for remedial exercises and
‘hardening’ before rejoining the reinforcement stream.19
The system was periodically modified as problems arose. In June
1916 Headquarters ctd ruled that men admitted to hospital from
units in England would be posted to the ccac if the hospital staff
determined they were unfit for full duty. Those who were insane or
suffering from epilepsy or tuberculosis would also be transferred to
the ccac for repatriation to Canada, presumably because of the need
for specialised medical care not available at the Canadian Discharge
Depot.20 Lastly it was decided in November 1916 that men with

18 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 74 File 10-8-22 Vol 1, AG Headquarters Canadians to Sir
George Perley 7 November 1916; The Imperial War Museum holds a printed copy
of a booklet System of Handling and Disposition of Casualties in the Canadian
Expeditionary Force (London: np, 31 October 1916). Presumably the author was
Colonel F.A. Reid, the Canadian Director of Recruiting and Organization
19 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, Chart showing progressive steps in
disposal of a casualty dated 11 January 1916.
20 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, Headquarters CTD circular letter 1
June 1916.
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newly-arrived battalions who were found to be permanently unfit by
medical boards would be transferred to the ccac for discharge or
posted to a garrison duty battalion to perform routine fatigues.21
The role of the ccd was to rehabilitate casualties and return them
to reserve battalions where they would be fed into the reinforcement
stream. However, Reid thought the reserve battalions would bungle
the job and in July 1916 wrote to the Officer in Commmand (oic )
of Reinforcements at Canadian Headquarters in London that “very
much better results would be secured in so far as Monks Horton
[CCD] is concerned, if the men from there were drafted direct from
Monks Horton to their Units in the Field. A large number of these
men, after they are in shape physically, are returned to Reserve
Units and are lost.”22 But, as oic Reinforcements pointed out, it
would be difficult to document, re-equip and dispatch men to the
continent directly from the ccd and as a compromise a new unit,
the 1st Canadian Casualty Training Battalion was created to return
men to their units.23 Intended to be a reserve battalion responsible for
reinforcing three fighting battalions at the front, the new unit opened
at Brighton on 23 October 1916.24 A simplified diagram of the new
arrangements is shown in Figure i .
The most successful part of this elaborate system was the c c d ,
designed to hold up to 4,000 men at a time in order to bring them
“to the necessary fit condition in a very short time to return to
duty overseas [in France or Belgium].25 From the beginning, this
unit returned a steady stream of rehabilitated casualties to reserve
battalions until the end of war. The success was such that a second
command depot followed in August 1916 and a third in January 1917.
The three depots were then harmonised with the reserve structure

21 LAC RG III B1 Vol 490 File R-50-1, Headquarters Canadians Brighton to GOC
Canadian Troops Seaford, OC Canadian Troops Crowborough and OC Canadian
Troops Seaford 20 November 1916.
22 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 48 File 8-5-58, Director of Recruiting and Organization to
OIC Reinforcements 21 July 1916.
23 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 48 File 8-5-58, OIC Reinforcements to Director of Recruiting
and Organization 22 July 1916; System of Handling and Disposition of Casualties in
the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 87.
24 LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 420 File E-103-1, Draft entry for CTD Orders 24 October 1916.
25 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 48 File 8-5-58, War Office to GOC Shorncliffe 17 April
1916 approving the establishment of the Canadian Command Depot and enclosing
War Office letter 24/General No. 4309 (AG 1) 1 October 1915 with the approved
establishment for a command depot; LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 48 File 8-5-58, CTD i/c
BF & P T to Director of Recruiting and Organization 19 July 1916.
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Figure 1: Simplified Outline Casualty Rehabilitation and Disposal 1 9 1 6

Casualty Battalion

Reserve Battalion

France or Belgium

France or Belgium

France

in England. Number 1 Canadian Command Depot was affiliated
with new regimental depots in the Shorncliffe area, Number 2 with
regimental depots in the Bramshott area and Number 3 for all other
regimental depots.26
The ccd training program was progressive and geared to the
trainees’ medical condition. On arrival, men were divided into four
groups: those who could do all exercises with no difficulty, those
who could not do strenuous exercises, those who could not do arm
and shoulder exercises, and those who could not do much except for
“gentle exercises, games and slow walks.”27 Not all convalescents were
enthusiastic about the carefully designed program to restore them
to full health, however, and in June 1916, Colonel Reid noted that
“these men are not all desirous of being again fitted for the Front,
and do not at all appreciate the Physical Training.”28
Unlike the ccd , the ccac was not overly successful. Intended to be
“a Central Authority [in England] for the controlling of casualties,”29

26 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, Headquarters Canadians Routine Order
1307 of 22 August 1916, Headquarters OMFC AG circular letter 7 January 1917
27 System of Handling and Disposition of Casualties in the Canadian Expeditionary
Force, 80.
28 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 48 File 6-5-58, Director of Recruiting and Organization to
Major-General Carson 27 June 1916.
29 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, Director of Recruiting and Organization
(Colonel Reid) to Canadian Records Office 9 December 1915.
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Sergeant of the Fort Garry Horse who went through the Battle of Cambrai, packing his kit
at Buxton, Canadian Discharge Depot. [Library and Archives Canada PA 005139]

A

creating and maintaining accurate and up-to-date records of the
whereabouts and status of all those held on strength was absolutely
essential. The ccac , however, failed to do this and thus became an
administrative nightmare instead of an efficient means of managing
manpower.
The ccac was an independent unit commanded throughout
its existence by Captain E.A. Hudson (promoted to major on 18
September 1916), a remarkably junior officer to command a unit that
reached a peak strength in February 1917 of 41,125 men, 13,849
of whom were in hospital.30 Each man had a personnel file and to
simplify record-keeping, Hudson elected to divide the files into five
groups based on the individual’s corps, an awkward arrangement that
did not acknowledge the many exceptions to the norm and led to
some confusion. “Difficulty is often experienced in maintaining these
categories” commented the Canadian Records Office in November
1916 “when a soldier belonging to the Infantry is attached to an

30 LAC RG 24 Vol 184 File GAQ 11-11C, historical summary “Canadian Casualty
Assembly Centre,” prepared by Edwin Pye 20 April 1939.
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Artillery unit for duty and subsequently returned.”31 The same could
be said for the Canadian Army Service Corps driver serving with a
field ambulance who was wounded and evacuated to England.
The status of the ccac as a unit also meant that only one set of
Part ii Daily Orders was issued.32 With more than 13,000 men posted
to or from the ccac in October 1916 alone, Part ii Orders were very
lengthy.333
4Not surprisingly, given the volume of personnel transactions
and the division of records, there were numerous errors. These errors
were compounded when reserve units provided inaccurate or incomplete
nominal rolls or in some cases, posted men to the ccac without notifying
Headquarters ccac .34 In some cases, reserve units failed to transfer
unfit men to the ccac . Private Roberts of the Canadian Cavalry Depot
suffered a compound fracture of the right leg when he was kicked by
a horse. After being treated in the Canterbury and Central Military
Hospitals, Roberts was transferred to the Canadian Special Hospital
at Granville on 9 January 1916 until he was discharged on 20 July
and posted to the ccac . From February to July 1916, Roberts was
unknown to the ccac who could not therefore manage his case.35 No
doubt others were in a similar position.
B y October 1916, it had become apparent to Prime Minister
Borden that the cef organisation in England was badly in need of
reform. However, given the extent of the problem, merely modifying
the existing structure was not enough and after careful consideration,
Borden and his cabinet approved an order-in-council on 27 October
1916 creating a new ministry, based in London, the Ministry of the
Overseas Military Forces of Canada (omfc ). A few days later, on 1
November 1916, Sir George Perley, the Canadian High Commissioner,
was formally appointed as the new minister.36

31 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, ‘Memorandum Relating to Organizing
the CCAC in Relation to Its Effect on Record Office’ prepared 24 November 1916 by
Colonel Kemmis-Betty, i/c Canadian Records Office
32 Part II Orders listed all changes to the status of individual soldiers including
promotions and postings.
33 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, ‘Memorandum Relating to Organizing
the CCAC in Relation to Its Effect on Record Office’ prepared 24 November 1916 by
Colonel Kemmis-Betty, i/c Canadian Records Office.
34 In other words, neither the reserve battalion nor the CCA C could be sure of
where the man actually was.
35 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 8341, personnel file 2475 Peter Joseph Roberts.
36 Desmond Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics: Canada’s Overseas Ministry in
the First World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 88-89.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015

11

Canadian Military History, Vol. 24 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 32
332

: A n A d m i n is t r a t i v e L e a r n in g C u r v e

One of Perley’s first jobs was to create an efficient military
headquarters to bring order to chaos. To do this, he brought MajorGeneral (later Lieutenant-General) R.E.W. Turner back from
France and appointed him General Officer Commanding (goc )
Canadian troops in England and de facto chief of staff of the new
Headquarters.37 Turner then selected his principal staff officers; in
particular the Adjutant-General, Brigadier-General P.E. Thacker,
a Permanent Force officer who had served as Director of Military
Training at Militia Headquarters and had been seconded to the War
Office in 1912.
The first task of the newly-appointed staff was to review the
state of the reinforcement structure in England. The results were
depressing. Lieutenant-Colonel McDonald, head of the General
Staff Branch, reported there was no system for the supervision
or coordination of training, unit establishments were unsuitable
both for training and supplying reinforcements, and there was a
lack of training materiel because Canadian establishments did
not correspond with British establishments. Thacker’s report was
similar. Reserve units did not have formal establishments, the
reserve organisation was ill-suited to provide reinforcements, and
the control of manpower by the ccac was unsatisfactory.38
Thacker’s comments were well-founded. In November 1916 an
audit by the Canadian Records Office in London showed that a large
number of men ostensibly with the ccac were actually serving in
France, had deserted, died, been repatriated to Canada or simply
did not exist.39 Nor was the 1st Casualty Training Battalion any
more effective. By 29 January 1917, there were 1,168 men with the
battalion. However with one exception all were in category Aiii (fully
trained but required hardening). In effect, the new unit was not a

37 Ibid., 98.
38 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 53 File “Monthly Reports February 1917,” Report: General
Staff, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 20 February 1917; Report: Adjutant
General’s Branch, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 20 February 1917.
39 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, “Memorandum Relating to Organizing
the CCA C in Relation to Its Effect on Record Office,” prepared 24 November 1916 by
Colonel Kemmis-Betty, i/c Canadian Records Office, Headquarters CTD Shorncliffe
circular letter 1 June 1916 referring to CTD Order 1636 of 1 April 1916 noting that
units had transferred men to the CCA C without notifying Headquarters CCAC.
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reserve battalion capable of providing reinforcements but an extension
of the c c d .40
Thacker moved quickly. Dissolving the Casualty Training Battalion
was easy and the unit was disbanded on 19 February 1917.41 The
command depots and discharge depot were working well and were
therefore retained. Doing away with the ccac however was another
matter. After careful consideration, Headquarters omfc announced in
February 1917 that the unit would be replaced by newly-organised
Regimental Depots commencing 10 March 1917. While casualties from
France could be absorbed by the new depots almost immediately,
transferring men from the ccac took some time, if for no other reason,
as Thacker wrote that care had to be taken “not to transfer more men
at one time than can be handled by the various [new] Regimental
Depots without causing congestion.”42 By the end of March 1917, the
new system was largely in place. However, it was not until August 1917
that more than 6,000 missing men could be traced and until then, the
ccac records section had to remain in existence.43*
The newly organised regimental depots were part of a larger
scheme to reorganise the cef in England and France on a rational
basis. For the infantry, battalions with the Canadian Corps in France
and reserve brigades in England were assigned to one of twelve
territorial regiments. Each of the regiments also included a regimental
depot. The remaining arms and services were not reorganised on a
territorial basis but a regimental or corps depot was created for each.
One of the principal reasons for the administrative chaos in the
ccac had been the sheer volume of personnel records involved and
the number of men on strength. The new structure, as spelled out
in February 1917 by Headquarters om fc , decentralised personnel
administration so clerks with the new regimental and corps depots

40 TNA WO 114/31 Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents
at Home other than the Territorial Force 29 January 1917; TNA WO 293/4 ACI
1023 of 19 May 1916 defined medical categories including Ain.
41 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, Headquarters OMFC Routine Order
762 of 10 March 1917 announced that the battalion had ceased to exist as of 19
February 1917.
42 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, Instructions for Dealing with Casualties and
Non-Effectives Generally of the Canadian Overseas Military Forces, 26 February 1917.
43 LAC RG 24 Vol 184 File GAQ 11-11C, historical summary ‘Canadian Casualty
Assembly Centre’ prepared by Edwin Pye 20 April 1939.
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Table 2: OMFC Reorganisation 10 March 19177
R e g im e n t

D epot

F i g h t i n g U n it s

1 st

Shorncliffe

2 pioneer battalions

Shorncliffe

5

infantry battalions

7

infantry battalions

7

Central Ontario Regiment

infantry battalions

1 labour battalion
2 nd

Central Ontario Regiment

Manitoba Regiment

Shorncliffe

1 pioneer battalion
1 labour battalion
7

British Columbia Regiment

Seaford

Eastern Ontario Regiment

Seaford

1 st

Shoreham

infantry battalions

1 labour battalion

Quebec Regiment

5

infantry battalions

4

infantry battalions

1 labour battalion
2 nd

Quebec Regiment

Shoreham

5

New Brunswick Regiment

Shoreham

2 infantry battalions

Western Ontario Regiment

Bramshott

Alberta Regiment

Bramshott

5

infantry battalions

Saskatchewan Regiment

Bramshott

5

infantry battalions

Nova Scotia Regiment

Bramshott

4

infantry battalions

Cavalry

Shorncliffe

4

cavalry regiments

Artillery

Shorncliffe

Service Corps

Shorncliffe

All service corps units

Engineers

Crowborough

All engineer units

Machine Gun Corps

Crowborough

All machine gun units

Medical Corps

Shorncliffe

All medical units

Railway Troops

Purfleet

All railway units

Forestry Corps

Sunningdale

All forestry units

All other corps and miscellaneous
details

Shorncliffe

4

infantry battalions

infantry battalions

1 pioneer battalion

All horse, field, heavy and siege
batteries and trench mortar batteries

Note: Fighting units included infantry battalions with the 5th Division.

45 LAC RG 9 III B i Vol 1002 File R-5-3 Vol 3, OMFC Routine Order Number 608
of 24 February 1917.
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Physical Training at 1st Command Depot, Shorncliffe. [Library and Archives Canada PA 005715]

had far fewer files to deal with which significantly reduced the
possibilities of errors.44
M circular instruction issued 26 February by Thacker spelled out
the administrative details of the new system. “Reserve units only
will be responsible for the training of fit men. The only unfit men
carried on the strength of Reserve Units will be those who are on
the permanent establishment [for general duties].”46 Garrison duty
battalions were disbanded and their functions assumed by regimental
depots. Those who were not fit were posted to a corps or regimental
depot if they were evacuated from France or, if serving in England,
were found to be unfit for service in France. Those who became fit
after hospital treatment or graduated exercises at a ccd were returned
to a reserve unit and then recycled into the reinforcement stream.47
In comparison to the ccac the new system was a model of
simplicity. While there is no direct evidence that it was any better than

44 LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 1002 File R-5-3 Vol 3, OMFC Routine Order Number 608
of 24 February 1917.
46 Unfit men were posted to every reserve unit to perform unit fatigues which
otherwise would have been done by fit trainees. LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 1111C, Instructions for Dealing with Casualties and Non-Effectives Generally of the
Canadian Overseas Military Forces, 26 February 1917.
47 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, Instructions for Dealing with Casualties and
Non-Effectives Generally of the Canadian Overseas Military Forces, 26 February 1917.
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Figure 11: Simplified Outline Casualty Rehabilitation and Disposal
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Note: Rehabilitated casualties were posted to France from reserve units only.

the c c a c , the fact that regimental depots, the command depots and
the discharge depot were retained until demobilisation was completed
in 1919 suggests strongly that the new organisation met the need for
accurate records and close control of personnel movements.
Specific cases illustrate the efficiency and flexibility of the
new system. Private Bagley of the 7th Machine Gun Company,
for example, was wounded at Passchendaele in October 1917.
Evacuated a week later to England, he was simultaneously admitted
to hospital and taken on strength of the Canadian Machine Gun
Corps Regimental Depot. Transferred to a convalescent hospital
13 January 1918, he fully recovered and was dispatched to the 3rd
Canadian Command Depot for hardening on 5 March 1918. Six
weeks later he was pronounced physically fit and returned to the
Canadian Machine Gun Corps Training Depot for posting back to
France.48 On the other hand, Private Bird of the Royal Canadian
Regiment became ill and was evacuated to England in February
1918. Posted to the Nova Scotia Regiment Depot, he was treated at a
convalescent hospital and then attached to a command depot in July
for hardening. However, his medical condition failed to improve and
on 25 August 1918 Bird was returned to his regimental depot and

48 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 336, personnel file 624851 Archie Clifford Bagley.
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Table 3: Men Evacuated to England 1917-1919 Disposition52
F ro m H o sp ita l o r

P ro p o rtio n

D isp o sitio n

F ro m C C D

R e g im e n ta l D e p o t

Total

(p ercen t)

Posted to reserve unit

212

142

354

59.6

Discharged to Canada

62

169

231

38.9

Transferred to RFC or RAF

0

4

4

0.7

Deserted

2

0

2

0.3

Died

0

2

2

0.3

Posted to Young Soldiers
Battalion

0

1

1

0.2

Total

276

318

594

Proportion

46.5 percent

53.5 percent

Note: It is assumed that men posted to a reserve unit were available for military service of some description
although medical complications could delay return to duty.

attached to the 2 3 rd Reserve Battalion for garrison duties before he
was returned to Canada.49 Private Kroeker of the 8th Battalion was
wounded in the Vimy sector at the end of April 1 9 1 7 and suffered
the loss of his left leg. Evacuated to England 2 May 1 9 1 7 , he was
posted to the Manitoba Regiment Depot and admitted to hospital
where he remained until 1 7 October 1 9 1 7 when he was repatriated to
Canada for further treatment. Unlike similar cases in 1 9 1 5 , Kroeker
remained on strength of his regimental depot throughout and was
not posted or attached to a reserve battalion.50
How successful were the ccac and the regimental depots? In
March 1916, Colonel Reid noted that 5,501 men had been screened by
ccac Standing Medical Boards of whom 2,363 or forty-three percent
would “be reclaimed for overseas service” after rehabilitation at the
Command Depot.515
2Since 60,308 men passed through the ccac up
tc] December 1916, it is estimated that as many as 25,000 former
casualties had been returned to duty, assuming that the majority

49 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 746, personnel file 814241 John Bird.
50 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 5258, personnel file 874497 Barney Jacob Kroeker.
51 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File 11-11C, Director of Recruiting and Organization to
GOC Shorncliffe 28 March 1916.
52 Taken from on-line personnel files found on the LAC data base “Soldiers of the First
World War,” available at http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/archivianet/index-e.html.
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An old soldier (73 years) bidding good-bye at the station, prior to sailing for Canada. [Library
and Archives Canada PA005134]

successfully completed their training at the ccd — a very significant
addition to the manpower pool.53
Reid’s estimate was based on a small sample of men admitted to
the ccd in a three month period and may have been understated. A
sample of 594 casualties evacuated to England from January 1917 to
February 1919 shows that 59.6 percent were eventually returned to
duty in some capacity. Less than half of these men passed through
the ccd but the majority of those who did (76.8 percent) returned to
a reserve unit and hence became available for duty. Admittedly the
sample may be too small to be statistically definitive, but the results
suggest the casualty rehabilitation system materially benefited the cef
by returning a substantial number of men to duty. With 125,884 sick
and wounded evacuated to England from January 1917 to November
1918, it is probable that more than 70,000 men were eventually posted
to a reserve unit and thus rejoined the reinforcement stream.54
Admittedly the figures are soft, but it seems evident that large
number of the sick and wounded were able to serve again in France;

53 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File 11-11C, “Canadian Casualty Assembly Centre,” DHS
summary written by Edwin Pye 20 April 1939.
54 LAC RG 9 III B3 Vol 3765, Strength returns CEF units in France and Belgium
January 1917-November 1918.
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a very substantial addition to the reinforcement pool. But, this
was possible only because the cef developed an efficient system for
managing casualties. Creating this system took time. Initially, in
1915, reserve units had a dual role; managing casualties and training
reinforcements. However experience showed that these roles were
mutually exclusive and in early 1916, casualty management was
centralised with the creation of the c c a c . But the ccac suffered from
poor records management and the sheer size of the organisation led to
inefficiency. Not surprisingly, when Headquarters omfc was formed
in December 1916, steps were taken to form territorial regiments with
regimental depots to care for those who were unfit. Decentralisation
proved to be the key and the system created in March 1917 was
a vast improvement over the c c a c .55 During the same period, the
cef in general and the Canadian Corps in particular moved from
a militia-based force to a well-organised, hard-hitting professional
army. The changes in casualty management were but one facet of this
development and a study of these changes clearly shows the transition
of the cef into an efficient force designed to fight a modern war.
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